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The history of military intelligence has now become almost inextricably bound up with 
that of intelligence generally. This is perhaps inevitable. As Sir Kenneth Strong, 
Eisenhower’s wartime intelligence chief, put it: 
 
Intelligence is indivisible.  No area of activity – politics, economics, military 
affairs, science and technology – can be treated as a subject apart and 
treated in isolation.1 
 
Although he was making a point about the necessity of centralised intelligence 
management, he captures the field’s inherent complexity and interdependence. In recent 
decades the submergence of military intelligence can also be attributed to the higher 
profile of ‘civilian’ intelligence, especially of collection agencies, within Western popular 
culture. In Britain the public automatically associate the MI prefix with the Security 
Service and Secret Intelligence Service even though both organisations have long ceased 
to be closely connected to the military. But it is not for this chapter to analyse British 
intelligence history as a whole. Instead it will attempt to disentangle the historiography 
of British military intelligence from the whole, and in so doing will try to suggest why it 
now has low profile.  The chapter will also offer a survey of the literature in the hope that 
this may be helpful to new scholars of the subject. This body of work has been focused 
upon the pre-1945 period, and so that date has been adopted as a de facto cut-off point.2  
                                                 
1 Kenneth Strong, Men of Intelligence (London: Cassell, 1970), 168. 
2 According to the Institute of Historical Research’s registers, between 1972 and 2009 there were 50 British 
and Irish history doctorates completed with ‘intelligence’ in their title.  From this sample, 42 have been 
completed since 1990, 35 were pre-1945, 23 had a military intelligence focus and, of those, 16 dealt with 
British military intelligence: http://www.history.ac.uk/history-online/theses accessed 27 June 2011. From 
1986 to 2010 the leading academic journal Intelligence & National Security (INS) published 123 articles on 
military intelligence history; 59 had a British focus and, of these, 47 were pre-1945: 
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/02684527.asp accessed 1 July 2011 & 27 June 2012. Military 
intelligence history delineated by inclusion of military, naval/navy, army, air, defence/defense, a named 
military organisation or leader, or a single battle/campaign in title and relating to events at least ten years 
prior to publication date. 
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The chapter draws the overall conclusion that to get ‘better’, studies of British military 
intelligence will probably need to get ‘duller’. 
 
The first challenge facing the academic historian of military intelligence is to define the 
parameters of the subject. The second challenge is to position their activity in relation to 
the broader fields of military history and intelligence studies.3 Definitional debates can 
often generate more heat than light, but in this case it is important to try to peg out what 
falls inside military intelligence and what does not. Because it was agreed presumably by 
consensus as far back as 1981, NATO’s definition of intelligence is a useful start point: 
 
intelligence / renseignement | Int.  INTEL | The product resulting from the 
processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially 
hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations.  The 
term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the 
organizations engaged in such activity.4 
 
Laid down at a time when that organisation had a very clear military purpose in 
defending against a Soviet threat, the focus is external, the potential targets are defined 
by their intent, and there is an overt link to operational activity. Taking this as a primary 
focus also allows the filtering out of the cognate areas of security intelligence, counter-
intelligence, deception and special operations. This conceptualisation is helpful in 
providing a general context, but it does not discriminate between military intelligence 
and broader ‘civilian’ intelligence. 
 
Delineating military intelligence by its producer is the obvious solution. Intelligence 
produced by people in military uniforms may be consumed mainly by those who also 
wear them, but the difficulty is that this relationship is not an exclusive one. What the 
military collect and analyse may be of interest to many others.  Things may be further 
confused if a country’s wider intelligence services are subordinated to their military 
command structures. The alternative would therefore seem to lie in defining military 
intelligence by its consumers, with all intelligence that might be used by those in uniform 
                                                 
3 The validity of ‘intelligence studies’ as a distinct academic entity might be challenged.  The author has 
listened to John Ferris doing so on more than one occasion. But for the purposes of this chapter its existence 
is assumed, although it is acknowledged that it may be more of a bureaucratic/academic construct than an 
intellectual/academic one. 
4 AAP-6, ‘NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions’ (2010) http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap-
6-2010.pdf accessed 4 July 2011. 
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being labelled as military intelligence. This is better but is still problematic as the net 
could then be thrown so widely as to become meaningless. The solution would therefore 
seem to lie in accepting, first, that its boundaries are always going to be blurred and, 
second, that military intelligence is not an absolute but is conditional upon the wider 
military context. In simple terms, what the people in uniform want or need will vary 
continually and may include material that at other times would be given the more 
civilianised labels of ‘political’, ‘technical’, or ‘economic’. To take an historical example, 
intelligence on the political stance of the Vichy French regime and its influence upon the 
behaviour of their forces would have been of considerable significance during the 
preparations for Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942. 
But eighteen months later, within the context of the invasion of Normandy, it would have 
been of marginal significance at best because of the very different geographical, military 
and political circumstances of that operation. These boundaries of military intelligence 
are perhaps more porous at the top than at the bottom. At the higher levels of strategy 
the use of the military as an instrument should be integrated closely with other aspects of 
a state’s power and so there will be greater overlapping of intelligence interests. Moving 
down to the operational and tactical levels, military organisations and their internal 
intelligence providers theoretically have more independence to conduct their business. 
This dichotomy also contributes to the overshadowing of military intelligence, with 
intelligence studies as a discipline defaulting naturally towards the study of the higher 
levels where the military become just part of the general mix rather than a discrete 
entity.5 But this does not preclude serious historical examination of military intelligence 
matters at these higher levels. For example, Peter Jackson’s excellent book on French 
intelligence in the 1930s began as a PhD thesis with a military title.6 
 
The rest of this chapter explores the historiography of British military intelligence by 
examining primarily the body of scholarly literature that currently exists. It also 
concentrates on the ‘modern’ period of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries as this is 
                                                 
5 Although very different in their tone and content, the following are notable for the prominence they give to 
military intelligence: Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); Mark Urban, UK Eyes Alpha: The Inside Story of British Intelligence (London: 
Faber, 1996). 
6 Peter Jackson, ‘French Military Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1936-1939’, PhD (1995) Cambridge; Peter 
Jackson, France and the Nazi Menace: Intelligence and Policy Making, 1933-1939 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
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the point at which a formalised intelligence function can be discerned within military 
organisations.7 After pausing to examine the relationship between intelligence and 
military history, the chapter examines general surveys of military intelligence history. It 
then explores the specific histories of British military intelligence using the four ‘P’s of 
people, policy, process, and product as a checklist to understand their relative focus and 
merits. 
 
Intelligence and Military History 
Intelligence was not missing completely from the history of warfare before Christopher 
Andrew and others proclaimed its significance in the 1980s.8 For example, the index of 
Cruttwell’s History of the Great War shows that half a century earlier one former 
intelligence analyst had managed to make reference to intelligence and/or espionage 
over 30 times in 600 pages.9 To be fair, he referred mostly to general perceptions rather 
than any meaningful discussion of intelligence systems, methods or reporting, but their 
scale and existence is still noticeable.10 Taking another snap-shot, this time from the 
1970s, Brian Bond’s France and Belgium, 1939-1940 contained a detailed discussion of 
                                                 
7 For examples of military intelligence in ancient history, see: Arther Ferrill, ‘Roman Military Intelligence’ in 
Keith Neilson & BJC McKercher (eds.) Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History (Westport: 
Praeger, 1992), 17-30; Rose Mary Sheldon, Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome: Trust in the Gods but 
Verify (London: Frank Cass, 2005), Chapter 9, ‘Roman Military Intelligence’, pp164-174.  For the early 
modern period: Gunther Rothenberg, ‘Military Intelligence Gathering in the Second Half of the Eighteenth 
Century, 1740-1792’ in Neilson & McKercher (eds.) Go Spy the Land, 99-114; Barbara Donagan, War in 
England, 1642-1649 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 99-114. 
8 The usual datum points are: Christopher Andrew & David Dilks (eds.), The Missing Dimension: 
Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (London: MacMillan, 1984); 
Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London: 
Heinemann, 1985); and the establishment of INS in 1986.  A similar point was made by Keith Jeffery in 
relation to the revelation of the ‘Ultra Secret’ in 1974: Keith Jeffery, ‘Intelligence and Military History: A 
British Perspective’ in David Charters, Marc Milner & J Brent Wilson (eds.), Military History and the 
Military Profession (Westport: Praeger, 1992), 105.  See also his general discussion of of the relationship 
between intelligence studies and military history. 
9 CRMF Cruttwell, A History of the Great War, 1914-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936); Cruttwell served 
in MI2(e) at the War Office in 1918. 
10 The exceptions to this are: French intelligence very poor due to inferiority in aeroplanes; Russian 
messages sent in clear; captured order; Allied air superiority prevents German reconnaissance; failure to 
anticipate Ottoman crossing of the Sinai; sacking of Charteris; Allied propaganda against German Army,  
Ibid., 17, 45, 80, 259, 351, 499 & 530. 
5 
Allied intelligence and military decision-making with regard to the Mechelen Incident.11 
But again, his writing did not stray too far into judgements about the workings of the 
intelligence machinery. Instead it focused on how commanders used the picture they had 
been given; his key intelligence point being that:  
 
It is of course only too easy after a military disaster … to select those 
scattered items of intelligence which, if correctly pieced together in good 
time, would have enabled the defender to parry the blow.12 
 
The growth of intelligence studies since then has, arguably, allowed military historians to 
provide a less forgiving perspective.13 In their landmark work on military effectiveness, 
Allan Millett and Williamson Murray placed intelligence systems alongside logistics and 
communications as key determinants of operational-level effectiveness.14 Therefore just 
as the quality of an army’s supply system or its radio network can be unpacked, analysed 
and judged, so too must its intelligence feed. Such enquiries might present specific 
methodological challenges, particularly with regard to sources and context, but they 
cannot be avoided if that military organisation is to be truly understood.  In this 
conception, intelligence provision is not some centralised or civilianised deus ex 
machina but an integrated part of the military system. Within military organisations, 
products such as daily intelligence summaries mount up at multiple levels at an alarming 
rate. This can present the researcher with a mountain of textual material to wade 
through in order to understand the nature of the intelligence picture at any particular 
moment. Such painstaking jigsaw work is not for the faint-hearted, but can be very 
rewarding. Similarly, careful analysis of operational documentation can pick up the 
‘echo’ of the intelligence picture even when the latter has not survived intact. 
                                                 
11 In January 1940 the Belgians captured, near Mechelen, a set of German invasion plans from a downed 
aircraft and passed the details on to the Allies: Brian Bond, France and Belgium, 1939-1940 (London: Davis 
Poynter, 1975), 78-81.   
12 Ibid., 80. 
13 See also the frequent appearance of intelligence in: Eliot Cohen & John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The 
Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: Free Press, 1990). 
14 ‘Do military organizations have the capability to support their operational practices with the required 
intelligence, supply, communications, medical and transportation systems?’: Allan Millett, Williamson 
Murray & Kenneth Watman, ‘The Effectiveness of Military Organizations’ in Allan Millett & Williamson 
Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness, Volume 1: The First World War (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 16. 
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It has helped that from the 1980s onwards academic military history has become more 
sophisticated, moving away from its traditional ‘drum and trumpet’ roots.15 But the 
question then arises as to whether historical examinations of military intelligence grew 
simply because of better academic military history or because of the emergence of 
‘intelligence studies’? The answer would seem to be that the two have to some extent 
been symbiotic, with intelligence studies providing, in its simplest terms, something for 
military historians to lean against. The existence of basic concepts and ongoing debates 
about matters such as intelligence failures or even just the intelligence cycle is helpful in 
framing historical work. For the mainstream of intelligence studies the existence of 
military historians doing intelligence work adds diversity to their community and can 
provide robust case studies of previous intelligence practice. A rough parallel might be 
drawn here with the development of the medical humanities and their enrichment of 
military history. For example, Mark Harrison’s award-winning studies of military 
medicine in the British Army during the First and Second World Wars, or the 
burgeoning literature on military mental health.16 Mischievously, it might also be argued 
that military intelligence history simply constitutes intelligence studies at its least 
glamorous. As Gerard de Groot put it when explaining why he shifted from studying 
Field Marshal Haig’s intelligence feed to studying the man himself: ‘Before long I 
discovered that [military] intelligence has very little to do with cloaks and daggers, being 
mostly about boring reports and endless statistics’.17 
 
Histories of Military Intelligence 
Academic military historians can be simultaneously gladdened and saddened by the 
popular military history market.18 In Britain, the proliferation of war documentaries on 
                                                 
15 Michael Howard, ‘Military History and the History of War’ in Williamson Murray & Richard Hart 
Sinnreich (eds.), The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 12-20. 
16 Mark Harrison, Medicine and Victory: British Military Medicine in the Second World War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004); Mark Harrison, The Medical War: British Military Medicine in the First 
World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).  Both have won the Society for Army Historical 
Research’s prestigious Templer Medal Book Prize. 
17 Gerard De Groot, Douglas Haig, 1861-1928 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), ix. 
18 For a measured discussion of the popular military history market, see: Jeremy Black, Rethinking Military 
History (London: Routledge, 2004), 39. For the long view, see: Tim Travers, ‘The Development of British 
Military Historical Writing and Thought from the Eighteenth Century to the Present’ in Charters et al (eds.), 
Military History and the Military Profession, 23-44. 
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digital television channels, the large military history sections of high street bookshops, 
and the popularity of conflict-based computer games testify to the public’s fascination 
with the subject.19 Although such a high-profile might be envied, there is always the 
nagging concern that popular military history is still too wedded to old-fashioned genres 
which thereby devalues the overall currency of the field. It is difficult to see how this can 
be changed. Indeed, its commercial success may be the very thing that makes it 
impossible for popular military history to break itself away from its well-worn subjects 
and favoured modes of expression. Military intelligence history is certainly not exempt 
from this context; in fact, the public’s fascination with spies, spooks and secret agents 
means that a similar dichotomy has always existed between academic and popular 
writings on intelligence matters.20 
 
Looking for popular surveys focused upon British military intelligence one is struck 
immediately by their scarcity.21 The ‘best fit’ for this requirement is probably Peter 
Gudgin’s Military Intelligence: The British Story which was published in 1989 and again 
in 1999.22  The first part of the book is a synthesis of key secondary texts which provides 
a potted history of intelligence in the British Army. This is followed by thematic chapters 
on intelligence functions, sources, espionage and counter-intelligence, and electronic 
warfare developments. The focus is inconsistent as the latter sections drift away from its 
ostensibly British and military focus. In the last decade the two most prominent works of 
popular military intelligence history have been John Hughes-Wilson’s Military 
Intelligence Blunders and Cover-ups (1999) and John Keegan’s Intelligence in War 
(2003).23 Both books adopt a case-study approach which includes British examples, as 
                                                 
19 For the context of history and heritage, see: Jerome de Groot, Consuming History: Historians and 
Heritage in Contemporary Popular Culture (London: Routledge, 2009). 
20 For an exploration of the wider relationship between intelligence and the media, see: Robert Dover & 
Michael Goodman (eds.), Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Why the Media Needs 
Intelligence (London: Hurst, 2009). 
21 Jock Haswell, British Military Intelligence (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1973) is to a great extent a 
history of the Intelligence Corps – it even has their cap badge on its dust jacket – and so it is examined in the 
next section. 
22 Peter Gudgin, Military Intelligence: The British Story (London: Arms & Armour, 1989 & Stroud: Sutton, 
1999). A former wartime tank officer, Gudgin’s other publications are on armoured warfare.   
23 John Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-ups (London: Robinson, 1999 & 2004); 
John Keegan, Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda (London: 
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well as addressing intelligence in war from a general perspective. 24 Although lively reads 
that are forthright in their judgements, they both rely on a very limited range of 
sources.25 More useful as scholarly entry points to the subject are recent encyclopaedia 
entries by Hugh Bicheno and Joe Maiolo.26 Bicheno skims across similar ground to 
Hughes-Wilson and Keegan and cites many of the same examples, but he does it in fewer 
words. Maiolo’s piece is much more helpful as he signposts many of the milestone 
publications in military intelligence history before summarising the evolution of the 
literature and debates on key issues, such as the contribution of signals intelligence 
during the Second World War. Similarly, although dated both Jonathan House’s military 
intelligence research guide and Keith Robbins’ bibliography of British history contain 
some pointers to important older books.27 Also, Wesley Wark’s 1988 summation of the 
British intelligence historiography still repays attention.28 
 
Shifting towards more scholarly surveys of intelligence, the military dimension is also 
present. Still a landmark in the historical study of British intelligence, Christopher 
Andrew’s Secret Service has a strong military flavour, particularly in his discussion of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hutchinson, 2003).  Keegan is a former Sandhurst academic and defence editor of the Daily Telegraph.  
Hughes-Wilson is a former Intelligence Corps officer and associate editor of Eye-Spy magazine. 
24 Hughes-Wilson: Barbarossa, 1941; Pearl Harbour, 1941; Singapore, 1942; Dieppe, 1942; D-Day, 1944; Tet, 
1968; Falklands, 1982; Kuwait, 1990-1991; World Trade Center/Pentagon, 2001. Keegan: Nile, 1798; 
Shenandoah Valley, 1862; Emden/Coronel/Falklands, 1914; Atlantic, 1939-1945; Crete, 1941; Midway, 1942; 
V-weapons, 1943-1944. 
25 Hughes-Wilson includes a handful of primary documents in his bibliography, but he relies on a small 
number of popular secondary sources for each of his case studies. Keegan provides footnotes and draws 
upon some academic sources, but they are still fairly limited in their scope. See the following reviews of 
Keegan: Joseph Mazzafro, INS, Vol.19 (4) 2004, 734-737; MJ Barber, Canadian Military Journal, Vol.5 (1) 
2004, 57-58.  Hughes-Wilson’s intelligence survey The Puppet Masters: Spies, Traitors and the Real Forces 
behind World Events (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2004) has better supporting references and 
includes some discussion of military intelligence developments. 
26 Hugh Bicheno, ‘Intelligence, Military’, in Richard Holmes (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Military 
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 447-448; Joe Maiolo, ‘Intelligence’ in Charles Messenger 
(ed.) Reader’s Guide to Military History (London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2001), 259-261. 
27 Jonathan House, Military Intelligence, 1870-1991: A Research Guide (Westport: Greenwood, 1993); Keith 
Robbins, Bibliography of British History, 1914-1989 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 351, 363 & 381. 
28 Wesley Wark, ‘Intelligence since 1900’ in Gerald Jordan (ed.), British Military History: A Supplement to 
Robin Higham’s Guide to the Sources (New York: Garland, 1988), 503-523. 
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what he calls the ‘Victorian Prologue’ and, of course, the two world wars.29  Andrew also 
argues the War Office made the ‘the first hesitant steps towards the creation of a 
professional intelligence community’.30 Jeffrey Richelson’s survey, A Century of Spies, 
makes a similar journey to Andrew’s but with a wider international and chronological 
focus.31 Again, his wartime chapters have the most to say about developments in military 
intelligence and include a number of famous British examples.  More recently the 
National Archives have published British Intelligence: Secrets, Spies and Sources in 
order to ‘highlight [their] rich and diverse collection of intelligence records’.32 Its 
chapters on military, naval and air intelligence fulfil this primary purpose but they are 
more a miscellany than a coherent account of developments in each of these fields. 
 
Augmenting these general surveys, we now have a specific literature on military 
intelligence as a discrete field of study. To a great extent responsibility for this can be 
attributed to the late Michael Handel and his erstwhile collaborator, John Ferris, who 
has continued to work in this specific field. This is not to argue that relevant work did not 
exist before their work in the early 1990s,33 but in approaching intelligence from an 
overtly strategic perspective they have provided – and in Ferris’ case, continue to provide 
– its military form with some strong theoretical and evidential foundations.34 The first 
                                                 
29 Andrew, Secret Service, 7-15, 20-33, 86-173, 448-486. The haphazard nature of historical writings on 
British intelligence before Secret Service is perhaps illustrated by two contrasting contributions to a 1984 
volume ostensibly about intelligence before the two world wars. One is a useful survey of pre-1914 policy-
making but has almost nothing to say about intelligence matters; the other surveys the pre-1939 intelligence 
community and discusses the utility of its products: Paul Kennedy, ‘Great Britain before 1914’ & Donald 
Cameron Watt, ‘British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe’ in Ernest May 
(ed.), Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 172-204, 237-270. 
30 Andrew, Secret Service, 7. 
31 Jeffery Richelson, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995). 
32 Stephen Twigge, Edward Hampshire & Graham Macklin, British Intelligence: Secrets, Spies and Sources 
(Richmond: National Archives, 2008), 15. 
33 For example, Strong’s Men of Intelligence was sub-titled ‘a study of the roles and decisions of chiefs of 
intelligence from World War I to the present day’ [1970] and examined the interaction between intelligence 
officers and their commanders. 
34 For Handel and Ferris’ academic careers, see: Richard Betts & Thomas Mahnken (eds.) Paradoxes of 
Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael Handel (London: Frank Cass, 2003), viii-x; John Ferris, 
Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays (London: Routledge, 2005), 1-7.  Ferris’ extensive body of work is 
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key datum point is the 1990 special issue of Intelligence & National Security which 
contained a very lengthy introduction by Handel which examined military intelligence 
within a Clausewitzian framework as well as surveying a number of examples.35 Five 
years later Handel and Ferris published a lengthy article entitled ‘Clausewitz, 
Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of Command in Modern War’.36 Taking forward 
their theory and history themes, they set out an important framework for the ‘evolution 
of the role of intelligence in military operations and war’.37 This posited three phases to 
the development of military intelligence starting from 1800 with the second phase 
delineated by 1914 and 1945. By examining various aspects of military intelligence 
practice across these periods and linking them to parallel developments in command and 
communications, they provided a very useful model for understanding both the past and 
present.38 
 
Histories of British Military Intelligence 
Categorising intelligence histories is not wholly straightforward. Although what follows 
has adopted a necessarily conventional and chronological structure, it is helpful to pause 
                                                                                                                                                 
included, where relevant, in the next section.  Because of the parameters set out at the start of this chapter, 
his excellent work on security, deception and non-military intelligence have been omitted. 
35 Michael Handel, ‘Intelligence and Military Operations’, INS, Vol.5 (2) 1990, 1-95 & Michael Handel (ed.), 
Intelligence and Military Operations (London: Frank Cass, 1990), 1-95. The origins of the special 
issue/volume lay in a series of conferences on intelligence and military operations held at the US Army War 
College in the late 1980s.  An earlier special issue had focused on leaders and intelligence: INS, Vol.3 (3) 
1988 & Michael Handel (ed.) Leaders and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1989). This collection included 
Harold Deutsch, ‘Commanding Generals and the uses of Intelligence’. 
36 John Ferris & Michael Handel, ‘Clausewitz, intelligence, uncertainty and the art of command in military 
operations’, INS Vol. 10 (1) 1995, 1-58; Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy, 239-287.  See also: Michael 
Handel, ‘Intelligence in Historical Perspective’ in Keith Neilson & BJC McKercher (eds.), Go Spy the Land: 
Military Intelligence in History (Westport: Praeger, 1992), 179-192. 
37 Commander’s interest in intelligence; organization; scope and range; sources and reliability; problems; the 
balance of intelligence; solutions to problems and better use: Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy, 281. 
38 More recently, see Ferris’ forewords to Stephen Harris, British Military Intelligence in the Crimean War, 
1854-1856 (London: Frank Cass, 1999) and Brad Gladman, Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in 
World War Two: The Western Desert and Tunisia, 1940-43 (London: Palgrave, 2009). Respectively these 
provide further reflections on Nineteenth Century military intelligence and command & control in the two 
World Wars. See also his elegant summation of intelligence more generally: John Ferris, ‘Intelligence’ in 
Robert Boyce & Joseph Maiolo (eds.), The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues (London: 
Palgrave, 2003), 308-310. 
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and reflect upon alternate typologies. Two varieties of military intelligence history can 
perhaps be labelled; those that are organisation-focused and those that are target-
focused. However, they should be seen more as opposite ends of a continuum rather than 
totally separate categories. Organisation-focused histories are perhaps more common 
and tend to dwell upon the more inward-looking aspects of people, policy, and process.  
This is not to say that they are unimportant, just that they often provide only a necessary 
foundation for later work.39 An obvious example would be Thomas Fergusson’s study of 
British Army intelligence in the late Nineteenth Century.40 Target-focused histories are 
generally more outward-looking and privilege the intelligence product and the 
interactions with consumers. Within the normal academic ‘rules of engagement’, those 
studies which tend towards this end of the spectrum are arguably stronger because they 
connect intelligence history more closely to its wider context. A classic British example 
from this category would be Wesley Wark’s The Ultimate Enemy.41 However, it should be 
noted that a necessary precondition for such a study is a mature military historiography 
within which the intelligence history can thrive. If the strategic and operational histories 
are immature, the intelligence historian will struggle to shape their own work to fit with 
its contours and controversies. This relative immaturity of the academic literature, rather 
than difficulties with the intelligence sources, may help to explain the relative paucity of 
post-1945 histories of military intelligence. 
 
Within the British context, it is also important to note the long tradition of regimental 
history as a particular flavour of military history. Despite their parochial focus and often 
celebratory purpose, these sources need to be taken seriously, particularly as, within 
their security restrictions, they often have interesting things to say about post-1945 
developments. The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force have long had intelligence-related 
branches,42 but it is the Army’s Intelligence Corps, with a continuous ‘tribal’ identity 
since 1940, which has been the direct or indirect subject of histories since the early 
                                                 
39 A similar point is made in: Jeffery, ‘Intelligence and Military History’ in Charters et al (eds.), Military 
History and the Military Profession, 110. 
40 Thomas Fergusson, British Military Intelligence, 1870-1914: The Development of a Modern Intelligence 
Organization (Frederick: University Publications of America, 1984). 
41 Wesley Wark, The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (London: IB 
Tauris, 1985). 
42 For an accessible survey of RAF photographic intelligence, see: Roy Conyers Nesbit, Eyes of the RAF: A 
History of Photo-Reconnaissance (Stroud: Sutton, 1996). 
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1970s. The first was Brian Parritt’s The Intelligencers which surveyed his corps’ 
antecedents from the Seventeenth Century to 1914.43 This was followed shortly 
afterwards by Jock Haswell’s British Military Intelligence which had a great deal to say 
about the corps. Written by a former infantry officer and popular military historian it 
provided a readable account of the wider intelligence context, organisational 
development, and individual contributions. Twenty years later the Sandhurst academic 
and part-time Intelligence Corps officer Anthony Clayton produced a fully-referenced 
official history which covered much of the same ground.44 As works of history, all three 
books wrestle with the fact that the modern Intelligence Corps and its predecessors have 
always had a wide variety of tasks; from those engaged in strategic collection or special 
operations who have simply worn their badge as a ‘flag of convenience’ in wartime, to 
more conventional intelligence sections operating in support of frontline commanders. 
This necessitates a patchwork approach to the subject matter. These histories also labour 
under what might be termed a ‘neglect complex’; a consistent theme summed up by 
Parritt’s opening line: ‘The British Army has never liked or wanted professional 
intelligence officers’. From an organisational perspective this piece of folklore may be 
useful, but from an external viewpoint the pace of intelligence professionalisation cannot 
be reduced to the vagaries of hierarchical prejudices.45  Hopefully future histories will 
place the Intelligence Corps in a broader and more measured context. 
 
Starting our general survey with histories of pre-1914 British military intelligence, one 
notes their relatively small number but also their improving scholarly quality.46 This is 
illustrated neatly by studies of intelligence support to the Duke of Wellington. Forty 
years ago there was only Haswell’s popular history, ten years ago came Mark Urban’s 
study of code-breaking in the Peninsular War, and more recently we have the emergence 
                                                 
43 Brian Parritt, The Intelligencers: The Story of British Military Intelligence up to 1914 (Ashford: 
Intelligence Corps Association, 1971 & 1983). It has recently been re-published with some brief additional 
sections: Brian Parritt, The Intelligencers: British Military Intelligence from the Middle Ages to 1929 
(Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2011). His military career culminated as Director of the Intelligence Corps. 
44 Anthony Clayton, Forearmed: A History of the Intelligence Corps (London: Brassey’s, 1993). 
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of academic work in the field.47 Moving forward to the mid-Nineteenth Century, there is 
Stephen Harris’ fascinating study of intelligence in the Crimea.48 The colonial campaigns 
of the second half of the century have attracted some attention but in light of their 
contemporary resonance their relative neglect is perplexing.49 Organisational 
developments at home and in the field are captured quite comprehensively in 
Fergusson’s previously mentioned British Military Intelligence,50 and for the period 
immediately prior to 1914, Matthew Seligmann’s painstaking reconstruction of the work 
of Britain’s military attachés in Germany.51 
 
The First World War period is blessed with a greater range of work.  The most prominent 
single volume history is Occleshaw’s Armour Against Fate (1989). Derived from a 
doctoral thesis, it sought to examine the Army’s intelligence efforts across the globe 
between 1914 and 1918.52 As contemporary reviewers noted, it was ambitious and 
informative but also idiosyncratic and eclectic in its focus.53 Two decades on, it can be 
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judged perhaps as typical of that ‘first wave’ of intelligence histories; it sought to do too 
much, it relied too heavily on private papers, and it also tried to tap into a popular 
market for spy stories. But it still remains, to some extent, a military intelligence 
equivalent of Andrew’s Secret Service. Since Occleshaw, our understanding of the Army’s 
intelligence work has been expanded in a number of directions through more tightly 
focused studies.  John Ferris has, with his customary thoroughness, examined signals 
intelligence while Dan Jenkins has subjected the British Expeditionary’ Force’s Canadian 
Corps to very close scrutiny.54 The author must put modesty aside and mention his own 
work on the Western Front.55 The Middle Eastern theatres of operation have also proved 
fruitful areas for research. We now have some understanding of intelligence matters in 
Mesopotamia and the Dardanelles,56 but the most notable work is Yigal Sheffy’s 
outstanding study of military intelligence in Palestine.57 By integrating all the 
intelligence sources with a nuanced discussion of organisational development and the 
operational decision-making, Sheffy sets a high benchmark for future works of military 
intelligence history. Polly Mohs’ more recent study of the Arab Revolt is also informative, 
but has an odd introduction that betrays some ignorance of military intelligence 
developments elsewhere.58 Naval intelligence between 1914 and 1918 is, unsurprisingly, 
dominated by the story of their codebreakers and such studies have had a long 
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pedigree.59 The key book is still Patrick Beesly’s Room 40 published thirty years ago,60 
but in recent years our understanding has been advanced greatly by Nicholas Black’s 
study of the naval staff which helps to put Room 40 in a better context, and by Jason 
Hines’ re-examination of intelligence and the Battle of Jutland.61 Until recently the air 
dimension was poorly served beyond John Ferris’ study of British air defence, but now 
we have Terrence Finnegan’s exhaustive treatment of Allied air photography.62 The 
immediate post-war period is notable for developments in our understanding of 
intelligence during the Irish War of Independence. Although the general context was 
sketched in long ago,63 more recent studies of lower-level activities have given a much 
better flavour of intelligence at the sharp end of a brutal guerrilla conflict.64 
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The Second World War and the years preceding it are now overshadowed by Ultra, as 
the signals intelligence output from Bletchley Park and its satellites was known.65 
Pushing aside the large and ever-growing popular literature,66 the core foundations for 
this field are primarily the dense volumes of Sir Harry Hinsley’s official history of British 
intelligence, which seek to give ‘an account of the influence of British intelligence on 
strategy and operations’.67 Although other forms of collection do appear, signals 
intelligence is the dominant feature.68  It is also worth noting that, despite its majesty, 
the history is quite clear about its structural limitations. As well as limited coverage of 
the war in the Far East, Hinsley notes that: 
 
While the archives are generally adequate for reconstructing the influence 
of intelligence in Whitehall, there is practically no record of how and to 
what extent intelligence influenced the individual decisions of the 
operational commands.  It has usually been possible to reconstruct what 
intelligence they had at their disposal at any time.  What they made of it 
under operational conditions, and in circumstances in which it was 
inevitably incomplete, is on all but a few occasions a matter of surmise.69 
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So the official history was far from being the final word. Indeed, even before it was fully 
published it was being supplemented by the work of Ralph Bennett, a mediaeval 
historian who – like Hinsley – had worked at Bletchley Park. In a series of studies 
focused on Ultra in specific campaigns he unpacked the flow of the intelligence product 
and its impact in considerable detail.70 As Ferris noted in his assessment of Ultra and 
Mediterranean Strategy, ‘future students [of Ultra] would do well to adopt the model of 
Bennett’s method’.71 This point might also be applied to any history of operational 
intelligence. 
 
The effect of intelligence on the British war at sea, especially the Battle of the Atlantic, is 
one of the more developed areas of scholarship. Patrick Beesly’s early work helped to set 
out the organisational foundations,72 and this was followed with case studies of specific 
famous engagements.73 More recently the focus has shifted to less well-known aspects of 
the conflict and a desire to understand the impact of intelligence across the campaign as 
a whole.74 Within this trend, Jock Gardner’s 1999 book Decoding History was a 
significant milestone as it sought to assess the true significance of Ultra. In drawing what 
he describes himself as a rather ‘downbeat conclusion’ he offers a useful corrective to 
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many of the wilder claims made about its contribution.75 Moving to the exploits of the 
British Army, Bennett’s body of work has been augmented admirably by Ferris’ 
exploration of signals intelligence developments in North Africa.76 Within the same 
theatre, Brad Gladman’s book Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support provides an 
excellent example of how intelligence, when integrated with the study of command and 
control, can bring fresh insights to a well-known campaign.77 Similarly, Kevin Jones’ 
work on the Eighth Army in Italy shows what can be achieved when intelligence below 
the theatre level of command is unpacked fully.78 For the Far East the contributions of 
Ferris, Anthony Best and Douglas Ford have generated a strong academic literature.79 
Richard Aldrich’s Intelligence and the War Against Japan is focused upon higher level 
relationships, but his discussion of Singapore and the development of signals intelligence 
are pertinent.80 The air war has some coverage, notably of the Battle of Britain and, more 
recently, explorations of intelligence and the strategic bombing campaign.81 Finally, the 
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contribution of air photography has emerged from the shadows, particularly the work of 
the Allied Central Interpretation Unit at Medmenham.82 
 
Reflections 
This chapter set out to excise pre-1945 British military intelligence from the general body 
of intelligence literature and subject it to close examination. The most obvious 
conclusion is that the literature remains unbalanced chronologically because of the 
greater volume of material related to the Second World War. In the British case one 
could argue that the national intelligence community reached maturity between 1939 
and 1945 and so this focus is wholly justified. This is probably true, but in the military 
sphere we still do not know enough about the journey up to that point. The archipelagos 
of case studies before 1939 need to become better connected. This does not necessarily 
demand that the gaps between them are ‘filled in’ as the archival survival of sources 
would probably not allow that.83 But we do need some carefully focused studies that 
explore some of our fundamental assumptions about organisational development and 
the integration of intelligence within the British military. Like archaeologists, we need to 
‘dig across’ the lines delineated by Handel and Ferris to test their boundaries.  Looking 
forward from 1945 the maturing of the wider military history should provide a solid 
context for military intelligence studies. Looping back, exploration of military 
intelligence in the ‘irregular’ campaigns at the end of empire perhaps also demands a 
much better understanding of such work during the period of empire itself. 
 
Thematically, we perhaps also need to re-visit our assumptions across the four ‘P’s. 
Because of the survival of private papers and a fair number of memoirs we may think we 
understand the ‘people’ dimension. However, given that these sources are ultimately 
self-selecting, are we seeing just ‘personalities’ rather than truly understanding the more 
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prosaic dimension of ‘personnel’? Grappling with the latter would require painstaking 
collation of data from service records to create something that would pass muster in 
social history circles. Similarly, we are probably confident that we have a good fix on 
‘policy’ and ‘process’; but again, is the picture we have a partial and overly formal one 
determined by the more accessible high-level documentary sources? Do we know enough 
about the informal workings of the intelligence system and, more importantly, its 
interaction with consumers at the lower levels? But it is in the sphere of the military 
intelligence ‘product’ that the greatest work is probably required. Where people, policy, 
and process are available as foundations, target-focused histories ought to become the 
default setting. Only by carefully analysing the intelligence output can its resultant 
picture can be compared to the operational context. Then, by understanding the 
connections and disconnections, the impact of intelligence on the wider military system 
can be properly understood. The advent of tools such as Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) within the humanities will surely help this process. 
 
Twenty years ago Christopher Andrew declared that ‘most of the history of military 
intelligence has still to be written’.84 Although progress has been made, his statement 
remains largely correct. Furthermore military intelligence history, particularly in its 
British manifestation, is unlikely to regain the high profile it had in the early days of 
academic intelligence studies. But as it nudges forward incrementally it can still make a 
significant contribution, particularly to the development of wider military history. As 
Keith Jeffery put it, also twenty years ago, ‘the real impact … will not necessarily be in 
specialist texts, but in general accounts’.85 It is inevitable that the cloak and dagger 
connotations will always linger, and the popular end of the market will always trade 
upon them, but perhaps the true measure of success will be when this small sub-field is 
viewed as being just as dull-but-worthy as military logistics. 
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